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Abstract The neo-Fregean account of arithmetical knowledge is centered around
the abstraction principle known as Hume’s Principle: for any concepts X and Y, the
number of X’s is the same as the number of Y’s just in case there is a 1–1 corre-
spondence between X and Y. The Caesar Problem, originally raised by Frege in §56
of Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, emerges in the context of the neo-Fregean
programme, because, though Hume’s Principle provides a criterion of identity for
objects falling under the concept of Number–namely, 1–1 correspondence—the
principle fails to deliver a criterion of application. That is, it fails to deliver a
criterion that will tell us which objects fall under the concept Number, and so,
leaves unanswered the question whether Caesar could be a number. Hale and
Wright have recently offered a neo-Fregean solution to this problem. The solution
appeals to the notion of a categorical sortal. This paper offers a reconstruction of
their solution, which has the advantage over Hale and Wright’s original proposal of
making clear what the structure of the background ontology is. In addition, it is
shown that the Caesar Problem can be solved in a framework more minimal than
that of Hale and Wright, viz. one that dispenses with categorical sortals. The paper
ends by discussing an objection to the proposed neo-Fregean solutions, based on the
idea that Leibniz’s Law gives a universal criterion of identity. This is an idea that
Hale and Wright reject. However, it is shown that a solution very much in keeping
with their own proposal is available, even if it is granted that Leibniz’s Law
provides a universal criterion of identity.
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1 The Caesar Problem
An abstraction principle, as it is understood in the context of the neo-Fregean
programme, is a principle of the form
ð8aÞð8bÞðRðaÞ ¼ RðbÞ $ a bÞ
where R is a term-forming operator taking as inputs expressions of the type a and b
and * is an equivalence relation on entities denoted by expressions of that type.
Neo-Fregeanism, championed by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, is an attempt to
provide an account of classical mathematics based on abstraction principles.1
In the case of arithmetic, neo-Fregeans appeal to what is known as Hume’s
Principle in the literature:
ð8XÞð8YÞð]X ¼ ]Y $ X 11 YÞ
i.e. for any concepts X and Y, the number of X’s is the same as the number of Y’s if
and only if there is a 1–1 correspondence between X and Y.2 The axioms of Peano
arithmetic are interpretable in the system obtained by adding Hume’s Principle to
pure second-order logic. This result is known as Frege’s Theorem.
According to the neo-Fregean, concepts introduced by abstraction principles
should be genuinely sortal. That is to say, the concept should have a criterion of
application and a criterion of identity. The criterion of application tells us what
objects fall under the concept, while, among these, the criterion of identity
distinguishes one from another. The Caesar Problem arises in the context of the neo-
Fregean programme, because, though abstraction principles provide a criterion of
identity for objects falling under the concept introduced, they do not in any direct
way supply a criterion of application.3 In particular, Hume’s Principle supplies a
criterion of identity for numbers (of concepts)—namely, 1–1 correspondence—but
fails to deliver a criterion of application. In other words, while the principle yields
an answer to the question whether any two numbers are identical, it leaves
unanswered which objects the numbers are. Consequently, it leaves unanswered the
question whether Caesar could be a number. Of course, it strikes us as obvious that
Caesar could not be a number. The problem for the neo-Fregean, however, is to tell
a philosophical story that will entitle her to hold that this is so.
Before I proceed to a presentation of the Hale–Wright solution to the Caesar
Problem, let me offer a few words on the intended scope of the paper. The project to
be pursued is internal in nature. The basic ontology of Hale and Wright—a sortal-
based ontology with certain features—will be assumed throughout. In making this
assumption, I do not mean to suggest that sortal ontology is uncontroversial, or that
there are no alternatives to it. I allow myself to make the assumption, however,
because the aim of the paper is not to convince someone who does not favour a
1 For more on the neo-Fregean programme see Hale and Wright (2001a), a collection of essays that
develop the programme and respond to various criticisms launched against it.
2 X 11 Y is definable in pure second-order logic: X 11 Y ¼df : ð9RÞð8xÞðXx ! ð9yÞðYy^
ð8zÞðRxz ! z ¼ yÞÞ ^ ðYx ! ð9yÞðXy ^ ð8zÞðRzx ! z ¼ yÞÞÞÞ:
3 Hale and Wright (2001b, p. 368).
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sortal-based approach to ontology and a neo-Fregean solution the Caesar Problem
that she should do so. Instead the aim is to shed light on Hale and Wright’s solution
to the Caesar Problem by presenting a version of their solution which makes it
clearer what the structure of the underlying ontology is and to show how a
substantial existence assumption can be eliminated without thereby losing the
solution to the Caesar Problem. This project is worthwhile pursuing, because it can
help facilitate a better understanding of a recent—and prominent—solution to the
Caesar Problem. Furthermore, it sheds light on the structure of the sortal ontology,
which, to my knowledge, is a matter that is not often explicitly discussed in the
literature on sortal-based approaches to ontology.
2 The Hale–Wright Solution to the Caesar Problem
Hale and Wright concede that abstraction principles do not in any direct way supply
a criterion of application for the concepts they serve to introduce. However, they
maintain that, if developed properly, the framework of sortal concepts and criteria
of identity does provide a solution to the Caesar Problem (Hale and Wright 2001b).
The basic strategy of Hale and Wright is to tell a story about the structure of neo-
Fregean ontology, which will make it clear that there is just no chance that Caesar
is—indeed, could be—a number. In brief outline, the ontology they envision is one
in which
… all objects belong to one or another of a smallish range of very general
categories, each of these subdividing into its own respective more or less
general pure sorts; and in which all objects have an essential nature given by
the most specific pure sort to which they belong. Within a category, all
distinctions between objects are accountable by reference to the criterion of
identity distinctive of it, while across categories, objects are distinguished by
just that—the fact that they belong to different categories. It is surely because
we already inchoately think in terms such as these that it strikes us as just
obvious that Caesar is no number (Hale and Wright 2001b, pp. 390–391).
An object’s falling under a given pure sort—or pure sortal concept—is a
necessary feature of the object. If x falls under a pure sortal F, it does so necessarily,
and could not survive were it to cease to be F.4 The concepts of Number and Person
are examples of pure sortals. Pure sortals contrast with a functional concept like
Doorstop. If an object falls under a functional concept, its doing so need not be a
necessary feature of it.
A reasonable reconstruction of the essence of the Hale-Wright solution to the
Caesar Problem goes like this (where F and G are used for pure sortal concepts, as
opposed to arbitrary concepts).
4 Hale and Wright (2001b, p. 387).
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All objects of the ontology fall under sortal concepts, each of which is assumed to
have a unique criterion of identity.5 Among the sortals we find categories, which are
maximally extensive sortals in the sense that (i) all sub-sortals of a given category F
share their criterion of identity and (ii) for any object x, if x is not F, then any sortal
G which x falls under does not share its criterion of identity with F.6 Internally,
objects are unified in a category by falling under sortals that share their criterion of
identity, while objects of distinct categories differ in exactly that respect, viz. that
any sortals they fall under do not share their criterion of identity. Once this picture is
in place, it can be shown that any two categories F and G are either co-extensional
or have no object in common. (More on this later in this section and in the
Appendix.) Since Caesar and numbers belong to different categories, Caesar cannot
be a number.
Below I will spell this reasoning out in greater detail. I will offer rigorous
definitions of the key notions and state the principles relied on in the reasoning. Five
definitions and three principles will be stated. Two of the definitions serve to
introduce an alternative to the characterization of a category adopted by Hale and
Wright. The alternative characterization is provided for two reasons. Firstly, it
makes it explicit that categories are equivalence classes under the relation ‘…shares
criterion of identity with…’ and so sheds light on the structure of the ontology
underlying the Hale–Wright solution to the Caesar Problem. Secondly, the
alternative characterization will be useful for the purposes of making the point
that the neo-Fregean can do away with categories and still succeed in banning
imperial inhabitants from the realm of abstracta.
These things being said, let me proceed to fill in the details of the reconstructed
Hale-Wright solution. First, it should be said what it is for two sortals to share their
criterion of identity. I will assume, with Hale and Wright, that every sortal has a
unique criterion of identity. As usual ‘iff’ abbreviates ‘if and only if’. ‘h’ denotes
metaphysical necessity, and ‘eqF’ and ‘eqG’ denote the equivalence relations giving
the criterion of identity of respectively F and G:
Definition 1 (Sharing criterion of identity) Two sortals F and G share their
criterion of identity iff (ð8xÞð8yÞðx eqF y $ x eqG yÞ: This will be written
‘Share=(F, G)’.
That is, two sortals F and G share their criterion of identity just in case, as a
matter of metaphysical necessity, any two objects are related by the equivalence
criterion giving the criterion of identity for F just in case they are related by the
5 There is a substantial literature on the notion of a sortal and the related notion of a criterion of identity,
including Wiggins’ (2001) influential work. Certainly some authors differ greatly from Hale and Wright
in their understanding of these notions and their range of applicability. See, e.g., Ayers (1974) and Geach
(1962, 1967). However, it is not my concern here to discuss the merits of the various views on these
matters. Throughout the paper I will assume the Hale–Wright view, as announced at the end of Sect. 1.
6 Dummett (1973, p. 76), Hale and Wright (2001b, p. 389). As stated by Hale and Wright, the second
condition of the characterization is ambiguous between an existential and a universal statement.
According to the former statement if an object does not fall under category F, then there is some sortal
under which it falls which does not share its criterion of identity with F. Here I have chosen to
characterize the notion of a category in terms of the latter, stronger statement since this is clearly what
Hale and Wright need in order to put the troublesome emperor to rest.
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equivalence criterion giving the criterion of identity for G. Note that Share= is an
equivalence relation on sortals.7
Let ‘F  G ’ be shorthand for ‘ð8xÞðFx ! GxÞ ’ and define sortal inclusion as
follows:
Definition 2 (Sortal inclusion) For any two sortals F and G, F is sortally included
in G iff F  G and Share=(F, G). This will be written ‘FG ’.
The definition says that F is sortally included in G (or is a sub-sortal of G) just in
case F and G share their criterion of identity and every F is G.
In giving Definition 1, it was assumed that the equivalence relation eqF that
yields the criterion of identity for a sortal F can hold between objects that are not F.
This will happen whenever F is sortally included in G—i.e. F  G—and there are
identical G’s that are not F. For in that case any such G’s will be related by the
equivalence relation that gives the criterion of identity for F, but will not be F’s—
and so, will not be the same F. As a consequence, eqF cannot be characterized as
specifying what it takes for two objects whatsoever to be the same F, but must
instead be characterized as specifying what it takes for two F’s to be the same.8
As Definition 2 implies that (8FÞð8GÞðF  G ! Share¼ðF; GÞÞ; the Dummett–
Hale–Wright characterization of a category mentioned earlier can be simplified to:
Definition 3 (Category) A sortal F is a category iff (8xÞð:Fx ! ð8GÞðGx !
:Share¼ðF; GÞÞ: This will be written ‘Cat(F)’.
If a sortal F is a category, it is maximally extensive in the sense that there can be
no sortal G which includes something F does not include and shares its criterion of
identity with F.
As noted, Share= is an equivalence relation on sortals. The equivalence class of a
sortal F under Share= is defined in the obvious way:
Definition 4 (Equivalence class under Share=) The equivalence class of a sortal F
under Share= is the class of sortals it is related to by Share=, i.e.
j F jShare¼¼ fG : Share¼ðF; GÞg:
Introduce the notion of a categorical sortal as follows:
Definition 5 (Categorical sortal) A sortal F is a categorical sortal iff it is co-
extensional with the union of its equivalence class under Share=, i.e. F is a
categorical sortal iff for any x, x falls under F just in case x falls under a sortal in
j F jShare¼ :
Definition 5 is the alternative characterization of the notion of a category
presented above. In order to show that Definition 5 does indeed provide a faithful,
7 This can be verified by straightforward reasoning and without making any substantial assumptions
about the nature of metaphysical necessity. Now, it will be a matter of metaphysical necessity that Caesar
is not a number. This is something that can be known a priori. It can be known a priori, because it can be
known through reflection on our concepts. Reflection on sortal concepts can serve as a guide to
metaphysical matters, because these concepts indicate real divisions in the ontology. In my understanding
of these matters I rely on conversations with Wright.
8 Thanks to a referee for making this point.
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alternative characterization of the notion of a category we need to show the
following:
Theorem 1 For any sortal F, F is a category if and only if F is a categorical
sortal.
The proof of Theorem 1 is straightforward and appears in the Appendix. In light
of Theorem 1, I will allow myself to switch freely between talk of categories and
categorical sortals.
What is gained by introducing the notion of a categorical sortal? An immediate
advantage of using Definitions 4 and 5 instead of Definition 3 is that the structure of
neo-Fregean ontology is made clearer. Definition 4 makes it explicit how sortals
bundle up in equivalence classes under Share=, and Definition 5 ties categorical
sortals intimately to these equivalence classes. Another advantage of speaking
explicitly about Share= being an equivalence relation is that this, rather than the
maximal extensiveness of categories, is what does all the work in the solution to the
Caesar Problem. This point will be argued in Sect. 3.
We now move on to state the three principles needed for the Hale–Wright
solution to the Caesar Problem. The first principle is the following:
Principle 1 Share= is an equivalence relation on sortals.
Strictly speaking, there is no need to state this as a separate principle, because—
as noted earlier—it follows by straightforward reasoning and without making any
substantial assumptions about the nature of metaphysical necessity.
The second principle is one to the effect that if two sortals overlap—i.e. have an
object in common—then they share their criterion of identity. That is,
Principle 2 For any sortals F and G, if ð9xÞðFx ^ GxÞ then Share=(F, G).9
Principle 2 is equivalent to the statement that no object can fall under sortals with
distinct criteria of identity—let it be Principle 20. Principles 2 and 20 are similar to
the principle (U) of Hale and Wright (see 2001b, p. 393) according to which no
object can belong to more than one category. However, they are more general in the
sense that (U) makes explicit reference to categories, while Principles 2 and 20 can
be incorporated into a framework without categories, as will be done in Sect. 3. I
adopt Principle 2 here, because in their brief discussion of (U) Hale and Wright in
effect implicitly endorse it. The principle will play an important role later.
The last principle reads as follows:
Principle 3 Let X1; . . .; Xa (a some ordinal) be sortals such that any two of them
share their criterion of identity. Then there is a sortal co-extensional with their
union.
9 Hale and Wright have themselves suggested the following principle (in personal correspondence):
(*) For any sortals F and G, if ð9xÞðFx ^ GxÞ then ð9HÞðH  F ^ H  GÞ
—and, indeed, an earlier version of the paper made use of (*). However, as an anonymous referee
observed, the slightly weaker Principle 2 is all that is needed by the neo-Fregean. Principle 2 follows from
(*) and the fact that Share= is an equivalence relation.
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Hence, whenever we have a range of sortals with the same criterion of identity,
there is a sortal which they are all sortally included in. In particular, Principle 3
ensures that there is a sortal which is co-extensional with the union of each
equivalence class under Share=. These sortals are, by Definition 5, categorical
sortals.10
This completes the list of definitions and principles, and we shall now turn to the
neo-Fregean solution to the Caesar Problem.
Let us start by recording a general fact about equivalence classes: any two
equivalence classes under a given equivalence relation are either identical or
disjoint. In particular, any two equivalence classes under Share= are either identical
or disjoint—i.e. either such equivalence classes contain exactly the same sortals or
have no sortal in common. This tells us something at the level of sortals, but, it is
recalled, the Caesar Problem poses a question of identity at the level of objects.
Fortunately, given the way we have defined categorical sortals, we obtain an
analogous result at the level of objects:
Theorem 2 For any two categorical sortals F, G, ð8xÞðFx $ GxÞ or
:ð9xÞðFx ^ GxÞ:
That is any categorical sortals F and G are either co-extensional or have no
object in common. The proof of this result is straightforward and appears in the
Appendix. (Given Theorem 1, an immediate corollary is that, for any categories F,
G, ð8xÞðFx $ GxÞ or :ð9xÞðFx ^ GxÞ:Þ
Theorem 2 is of interest to us here, because it is a big step towards a neo-Fregean
solution to the Caesar Problem. Its significance is captured in what I will refer to as
‘The Conditional Result’:
The Conditional Result If the (unique) criterion of identity associated with
respectively the sortal concept of Number and that of Person are distinct, then no
number can be a person.
Hale and Wright take it that the antecedent obtains.11 On this assumption it is
straightforward to reason to the consequent.
Assume that the criteria of identity associated with respectively the sortal concept
Number and the sortal concept Person are distinct. By Definition 4, Number and
Person belong to different equivalence classes under Share=. By Definition 5 and
Principle 3, there is a categorical sortal corresponding to each of these equivalence
classes. Let these categorical sortals be F and G. Number is sortally included in one
10 Principle 3 is restricted to sortals that share their criterion of identity. If the result of taking arbitrary
unions of sortals were a sortal, the neo-Fregean would be committed to a single super-sortal–i.e. the sortal
co-extensive with the union of all sortals in the ontology. Hale and Wright deny that there is such a sortal
(Hale unpublished note). For further discussion of an intimately related matter, see Sects. 4 and 5.
11 Hale and Wright (2001b, p. 389).
Solving the Caesar Problem Without Categorical Sortals 147
123
of these and Person in the other. Since F and G are distinct categorical sortals, we
can, by Theorem 2, conclude that Caesar cannot be a number.12
3 Doing Away with Categories
In the previous section, a reconstruction of the Hale-Wright solution to the Caesar
Problem was provided, offering along the way an alternative characterization of the
notion of a category, which–it is hoped–serves to make the structure of the ontology
envisioned by Hale and Wright fairly clear.
Concerns may remain. A potential source of concern is the reliance on
categorical sortals. Someone might be sympathetic to the idea of a sortal-based
ontology, but be reluctant to buy into the existence of categorical sortals. Is there
any way to satisfy a person with this kind of reservation? It turns out there is. One
can simplify the framework from the previous section by dropping the assumption
that there are categorical sortals and still provide a solution to the Caesar Problem.
Here goes:
Adopt the framework from the previous section, but leave out Definition 5 and
Principle 3, i.e. suppose that we do away with categorical sortals. Why does this
more minimal framework hold a solution to the Caesar Problem? The reason is this:
maximal extensiveness is not essential to the proposed solution. What matters is that
Share= is an equivalence relation on sortals. Once this relation is in place, sortals
bundle up in equivalence classes under the relation. Any two equivalence classes
under Share= will either be identical or disjoint, i.e. contain the exact same sortals or
have no sortal in common. Since criteria of identity are assumed to be unique, no
sortals with distinct criteria of identity can be in the same equivalence class under
Share=.
Having observed this, suppose that the antecedent of the Conditional Result is
granted, as do Hale and Wright. We have already seen that, within their framework,
this implies that Number and Person are sortally included in distinct categories. In
our trimmed-down version of the framework, we are not entitled to hold this—since
we have left categories behind. By Definition 4, we are, however, entitled to hold
that the sortals Number and Person are in different equivalence classes under
Share=. By Principle 2 (or 20) it now follows that Caesar cannot fall under the
concept of Number, as desired.13
12 Note that the reasoning only goes through because Principle 2 has been assumed. The principle ensures
that objects are rooted in exactly one category by obstructing the following line of thought: ‘Your result
that any two categories are either co-extensional or have no object in common is no good. It might just be
that Caesar falls under sortals with distinct criteria of identity and can thus be in two categories after all.’
Some people would certainly find Principle 2 objectionable. Whether or not Principle 2 is legitimate
pertains to the question what is the proper characterization of the notion of a sortal and the related notion
of a criterion of identity. Though this is an interesting question, it is not one I will engage with here, as
announced in an earlier footnote.
13 Someone might object that the solution just given only goes through because of the extra generality
packed into Principle 2 compared to the principle (U) of Hale and Wright. However, as said earlier,
Principle 2 merely makes explicit a commitment already implicit in Hale and Wright in their endorsement
of (U).
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4 All Under One?
In this section, I will discuss a worry about the two approaches to the Caesar
Problem presented in Sects. 2 and 3. The worry emerges when we consider the
question whether there is a single criterion of identity which, for any two objects
whatsoever, determines whether they are identical or not. The worry can be spelled
out as a two-step argument. The first step makes it clear why it would be
problematic if there were a single criterion by appeal to which all questions of
identity could be settled. The second step of the argument aims to show that there is
indeed such a criterion of identity.
Let us turn to the first step: why would it be a problem for the solutions to the
Caesar Problem proposed above if there were a single criterion of identity which,
for any objects whatsoever, determined whether they are identical or not? To answer
this question let us take a step back and reflect on the basic idea behind the Hale-
Wright and the ‘no-categories’ solutions–namely, that two objects are only eligible
for being identical provided that they fall under sortal concepts that share their
criterion of identity. According to this picture, if the sortal concepts of Person and
Number do not share their criterion of identity—as the neo-Fregean holds—Caesar
cannot be a number. However, if there were a single criterion of identity by appeal
to which all questions of identity could be settled, this line of thought would be
undermined. For in that case Caesar would be eligible for being identical to a
number by the lights of the neo-Fregean.14
Let us now turn to the second step of the argument. The target conclusion is that
there is a single criterion of identity, supplied by Leibniz’s Law, by appeal to which
all questions of identity can be settled. According to Leibniz’s Law, any two objects
are identical just in case they share all their properties. This principle is taken as a
definition of identity (for first-order objects) in standard second-order logic.15 It can
be formalized as follows:
(LL) ð8xÞð8yÞðx ¼ y $ ð8XÞðXx $ XyÞÞ
where the range of the second-order quantifier is all properties on the first-order
domain. (That is, the range of the second-order quantifier is the arbitrary subclasses
of the first-order domain.)
The relation of sharing all properties is an equivalence relation on objects. Let
this equivalence relation be denoted by ‘eqU’ and consider the claim that it provides
a universal criterion of identity, i.e. a criterion which, for any objects whatsoever,
14 Hale expresses the view that the existence of a single, all-inclusive category would be bad news for the
neo-Fregean (Hale unpublished note), but does not spell out why this is so. He also does not offer any
reason why, on the Hale–Wright view, there should be no such a category. The former matter has just
been addressed. The latter matter will not be addressed here. I will, though, discuss a related matter in
Sect. 5 where it is argued that, after a fashion, a solution to the Caesar Problem is available even if there is
a universal criterion of identity and, so, a single all-compassing category.
15 Shapiro (1991, p. 63). It is interesting to note that, having stated the definition, Shapiro continues to
say, ‘I do not intend to assert a deep philosophical thesis about identity with this definition.’ As an
anonymous referee remarks, this is presumably because x = y and ð8XÞðXx $ XyÞ are provably
equivalent in standard second-order logic. On other the hand, the objection to be rehearsed below does
take Leibniz’s Law to be a deep philosophical thesis about identity.
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will allow us to determine whether or not they are identical. Now, since (LL) is a
definition, it should hold of metaphysical necessity, i.e.
ðLL(Þ (ð8xÞð8yÞðx ¼ y $ ð8XÞðXx $ XyÞÞ
or, using the abbreviation for the relation of sharing all properties,
(ð8xÞð8yÞðx ¼ y $ x eqU yÞ:
Recall that, for a sortal F, there is a principle of the following form:
(1) ð8xÞð8yÞðx ¼ y $ x eqF yÞ
where the right-hand side of the embedded bi-conditional gives the criterion of
identity for F. Sortals are, in part, individuated by their criterion of identity, and (1)
can thus reasonably be strengthened to:
ð1(Þ (ð8xÞð8yÞðx ¼ y $ x eqF yÞ
Finally, recall that two sortals F and G share their criterion of identity just in case
(2) (ð8xÞð8yÞðx eqF y $ x eqG yÞ
Thus, in order to show that eqU is a universal criterion of identity what needs to be
established is that, for any criterion of identity eqF of a sortal F,
(ð8xÞð8yÞðx eqF y $ x eqU yÞ:
Given the principles just stated, one can argue as follows: consider an arbitrary sortal
F, arbitrary objects x and y, and suppose that x eqF y. By (1h), x = y—and so, by (LLh),
x eqU y. Hence, x eqF y ! x eqU y: Conversely, suppose that x eqU y. Then x = y, by
(LLh)—whence x eqF y, by (1h). Thus, x eqU y ? x eqF y. Combining these
results, we get x eqF y $ x eqU y. Since x and y were arbitrary, we get ð8xÞð8yÞ
ðx eqF y $ x eqU yÞ: The principles relied on in the reasoning hold as a matter of
metaphysical necessity, and thus, we obtain(ð8xÞð8yÞðx eqF y $ x eqU yÞ:
In sum, contrary to what proponents of neo-Fregean solutions to the Caesar
Problem maintain, there is a universal criterion of identity. The neo-Fregean
solution—whether of the Hale–Wright or the no-categories kind—thus founders:
whether we are dealing with people, numbers, or any other kinds of objects,
Leibniz’s Law provides the criterion of identity.16
5 Concession Without Defeat: How to Recover the Solution to the Caesar
Problem
What is the status of Leibniz’s Law within the neo-Fregean framework? Hale and
Wright only address this question in passing. They say that whether or not Leibniz’s
Law ‘offers a correct analysis of identity, it is clear that the idea of items’ sharing all
their (bona fide) properties cannot possibly serve as a working standard of
identity.’17 This suggests that they hold the view that, even if Leibniz’s Law is true,
16 Versions of the objection just rehearsed have been put to me by a number of people, including an
anonymous referee.
17 Hale and Wright (2001a, b, p. 388).
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it is a further question whether it can provide a universal criterion of identity—and
one which they think should be answered in the negative.
Hale and Wright present two arguments in support of a negative answer.
However, they are both very condensed and rest on substantive assumptions that are
left undefended.18 Fully unpacking the arguments would be quite the task. Instead
of trying to execute it I will turn to a wholly different line of response—namely, a
concessive one. The response starts by granting that Leibniz’s Law provides a
universal criterion of identity, but proceeds to argue that this does not undermine a
solution to the Caesar Problem in keeping with the spirit of the solution offered
originally. Dialectically this is a strong card for the neo-Fregean to hold.19
Now, to spell out the concessive line of response in detail, suppose that Leibniz’s
Law does indeed provide a universal criterion of identity and proceed to introduce a
new, yet somewhat familiar-looking piece of terminology:
Definition 1* (Sub-sharing a criterion of identity) Two pure sortals F and G sub-
share a criterion of identity iff (ð8xÞð8yÞðx eqF y $ x eqG yÞ; where eqF and eqG
are non-universal criteria of identity of respectively F and G. This will be written
‘Sub-Share=(F, G)’.
In the present setting, the idea is that Sub-share=(F, G) holds just in case F and G
share some criterion of identity less general than the one provided by Leibniz’s
Law.
Given Definition 1*, we obtain Principles 1*–3* and Definitions 4*–5* from
Principles 1–3 and Definitions 4–5 by replacing occurrences of ‘Share=’ with ‘Sub-
Share=’. Definition 4* defines equivalence classes under Sub-Share= in the obvious
way, while Definition 5* introduces sub-categorical sortals as sortals that are co-
extensional with their equivalence class under Sub-Share=. Principle 1* states that
Sub-Share= is an equivalence relation on sortals, while, according to Principle 2*,
any sortals that have an object in common are related by Sub-Share=. Principle 2*
ensures that no object can fall under sortals that do not sub-share some criterion of
identity. Principle 3* says that there is a sortal co-extensional with the union of any
sortals X1 …Xa (a an ordinal) related by Sub-Share=. This guarantees that there is a
sub-categorical sortal for any equivalence class under Sub-Share=.
The following analogue of Theorem 2 can be established:
Theorem 2* For any two sub-categorical sortals F, G, ð8xÞðFx $ GxÞ or
:ð9xÞðFx ^ GxÞ:
18 As can be verified by consulting Hale and Wright (2001b, p. 388).
19 In Sect. 1, it was stated that the Hale–Wright framework would be assumed throughout. One way of
understanding this statement is that a sortal-based framework will be assumed throughout, and that the
antecedent of the Conditional Result will be assumed throughout as well (i.e. that the (unique) criterion of
identity associated with respectively the sortal concept Person and that of Number will be assumed to be
distinct). Another, weaker way of understanding the statement is to take it to involve only the first
assumption. What I intended was the weaker reading, and the argument given in Sect. 4 precisely
challenges the antecedent of the Conditional Result by pushing the line that there is a universal criterion
of identity. This seems to me a fair challenge, as Hale and Wright worry about there being a single all-
encompassing category—and relatedly, a universal criterion of identity—but never supply any argument
against the existence of such a category.
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That is any sub-categorical sortals F and G are either co-extensional or have no
object in common. This result can be established by modifying the proof of
Theorem 2.
Theorem 2* is relevant to our present concern—how to recover the neo-Fregean
solution to the Caesar Problem. The significance of Theorem 2* is captured in what
we can call ‘The Conditional Result*’, a modification of The Conditional Result
from Sect. 2:
The Conditional Result* If the sortal concept of Number and that of Person sub-
share no criterion of identity, then no number can be a person.
Provided that the antecedent obtains, the consequent easily follows:
Assume that Number and Person sub-share no criterion of identity. By Definition
4*, Number and Person belong to different equivalence classes under Sub-Share=.
By Definition 5* and Principle 3*, there is a sub-categorical sortal corresponding to
each of these equivalence classes. Let these sub-categorical sortals be F and G.
Number is sortally included in one of these and Person in the other. Since F and G
are distinct sub-categorical sortals, we can, by Theorem 2*, conclude that Caesar
cannot be a number.20
20 The following objection is due to an anonymous referee: Consider a model whose domain has as
subsets the set of real numbers, the set of natural numbers and the set of people. The referee assumes—
reasonably, I grant—that, for each natural number and each person, there is a unique predicate that holds
true of it. Now, interpret the second-order universal quantifier in Leibniz’s Law as ranging over the
subsets of the domain that serve as the semantic value of some unique predicate of the kind indicated,
whether atomic or complex. Under this interpretation Leibniz’s Law covers both natural numbers and
people, and, yet, it is less general than Leibniz’s Law without the indicated restrictions. Among other
things, the unrestricted version provides a criterion of identity for real numbers, but the restricted version
cannot (assuming that the language is countable). Hence, the attempted recovery fails: Number and
Person sub-share a criterion of identity.
It seems to me that at least two lines of response are available. First, one can draw attention to the fact
that, in the present dialectical setting, it has to be kept in mind that Leibniz’s Law is also meant to supply
a universal criterion of identity. For it was the worry about there being a universal criterion of identity—
supplied by Leibniz’s Law—that got us to the point where it might be thought attractive to pursue a
recovery along the lines that I have suggested. To get Leibniz’s Law on its intended interpretation—i.e.
under the interpretation that will allow it to serve as a universal criterion of identity—the second-order
quantifier needs to range over the full power set of the (first-order) domain. This interpretation of the
second-order quantifier is the one given in standard semantics of second-order logic. Now, since the
second-order quantifier is a logical item, it should receive the same interpretation in every model. If the
standard interpretation is given across the board, and Leibniz’s Law receives the intended interpretation,
the worry just presented goes away. On the other hand, if the restricted interpretation of the second-order
quantifier is given in every model, and Leibniz’s Law is interpreted accordingly, then the worry about
there being a universal criterion of identity goes away–and, with it, the need to attempt a recovery in the
first place.
Second, one can draw attention to an idea which is integral to the sortal framework and which it is not
clear that the objection can easily accommodate. The idea is this: criteria of identity must be associated
with concepts that are pure sortals. An immediate question thus presents itself: what is the pure sortal
concept that the restricted version of Leibniz’s Law is associated with? For the unrestricted version of
Leibniz’s Law, the answer is ‘Object’ or ‘Entity’. However, it is more difficult to provide an answer for
the restricted version. Consider the suggestion that Number-or-Person is the relevant pure sortal. This
seems implausible, because, upon reflection, the restricted version of Leibniz’s Law should be able to
serve as a criterion of identity for the class of objects that each has a property which is the semantic value
of some (atomic or complex) predicate that applies uniquely to it. But what is the pure sortal that all these
objects are meant to fall under? If there is a concept under which all the aforementioned objects fall, it is
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The Conditional Result* depends on Principle 2*. Principle 2* ensures that
objects are rooted in exactly one sub-categorical sortal. In the spirit of the no-
categories solution presented earlier, it might be suggested that Principle 2* enables
us to recover the solution to the Caesar Problem in a framework that does not
include Principle 3*. That is, in a framework that does away with sub-categorical
sortals. In our present setting, this no-sub-categories proposal would commit one to
accepting the existence of the universal, or all-inclusive, category, while rejecting
the existence of sub-categories. There would be something slightly odd about that.
Hence, if the concessive strategy is to be pursued, I recommend that it be pursued in
its sub-categorical form.
Let me finish this section with some brief closing remarks on the recovered
solution. The driving thought behind the solution is that, although there is a
universal criterion of identity—and a corresponding equivalence class under Share=
containing every sortal—the internal structure of this equivalence class is still
sufficiently divisive to keep numbers and people apart. The universal criterion of
identity and the corresponding equivalence class may run against the letter of the
original neo-Fregean proposal, as envisioned by Hale and Wright. However, it need
not run against its spirit. For the structure of the ontology behind the recovered neo-
Fregean solution very much preserves the features of the ontology behind the
original solution. Sub-categorical sortals are the would-be categories of the Hale-
Footnote 20 continued
presumably a highly gerrymandered or artificial one—and it is a substantive issue whether such a concept
can count as a pure sortal.
The referee also offers the equivalence relation ’ as a counterexample to the proposed solution,
where ’ is defined as follows: ð8xÞð8yÞðx ’ y $ any bijective mapping f between the union of Person
and Number and the von Neumann ordinal x0 is such that f(x) = f(y)). ’ gives a criterion of identity for
people as well as numbers—indeed, it would appear to do so for any pair of countable sortals. Yet, it does
not deliver a criterion of identity for uncountable sortals and, so, is not a universal criterion of identity.
Other logical or mathematical constructions can be carried out to deliver the same result.
When confronted with this supposed counterexample, adherents of sortal-based solutions to the Caesar
Problem would harbour exactly the kind of reservation mentioned above. That is, they would not be
convinced that the objection is a devastating one, because the objector faces several tasks. First, it must be
specified what concept the equivalence relation that is meant to cause trouble serves as the criterion of
identity for. Second, even if a concept can be specified, the further—crucial—issue remains whether it is
a pure sortal. If, as would seem likely, the alleged trouble-making criteria of identity are paired with
gerrymandered or artificial concepts, it is not clear that the neo-Fregean needs to worry.
Objectors may be dissatisfied with this kind of response and maintain that advocates of the proposed
sortal-based solution cannot legitimately help themselves to assumptions about what kinds of concepts
can enjoy a standing as pure sortals. These assumptions, they insist, must be argued for separately. I beg
to differ. It seems to me that Hale and Wright—and others who favour a sortal-based approach to the
Caesar Problem—can legitimately help themselves to the assumptions in question. At least they can do so
in the context of this paper. For recall that the goal here is to execute a project that is internal to the neo-
Fregean programme. The goal is not to convince the unconvinced. That is, this paper is not meant to
convince those who are not already attracted to a broadly neo-Fregean approach to the Caesar Problem
that such an approach is indeed the right one. Rather the task that I have set myself is to present a
framework that makes the structure of neo-Fregean ontology clearer and also helps one to appreciate that
a substantial existence assumption (the existence of categorical sortals) can be abandoned without
undermining the prospects of a solution that is adequate from a broadly neo-Fregean point of view. The
sortal-based framework is something that is taken as background, not something that is meant to be
defended. Thus, although considerations on—or defences of—various aspects of sortal-based ontology
are interesting and important, they are not part of the project that is being undertaken here.
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Wright framework in that they are the most general sortals, short of the universal,
all-inclusive categorical sortal. They are so in the sense that, if F is a sub-categorical
sortal, there can be no other sortal G such that ð8xÞðFx ! GxÞ; Sub-share=(F, G),
and ð9xÞð:Fx ^ GxÞ:21
6 Conclusion
In Sects. 1–3, two things were accomplished. First, I presented a reconstruction of
the Hale–Wright framework which makes it clear how their solution to the Caesar
Problem works. In particular, Definition 5 served to introduce the notion of a
categorical sortal, which sheds light on the structure of the ontology underlying the
Hale–Wright solution by linking categorical sortals intimately to equivalence
classes under Share=. Second, it was argued that a solution to the Caesar Problem
can be given in a framework where no categorical sortals are assumed to exist. This
is worth pointing out as some people may be sceptical about buying into the
existence of categorical sortals though they are sympathetic to the idea of a sortal-
based ontology. The lesson to be learned from this is the following: what matters to
a sortal-based solution to the Caesar Problem is not maximal extensiveness, but
rather the fact that sortals bundle up in equivalence classes under Share=.
Section 4 presented a challenge to the Hale-Wright and no-categories solutions to
the Caesar Problem. The challenge was this: Leibniz’s Law provides a universal
criterion of identity, i.e. a criterion that will determine for any two objects
whatsoever whether or not they are identical. The contention was that this
undermines the proposed solutions, because they rely crucially on the assumption
that the criteria of identity of Number and Person are distinct. In Sect. 5, I spelled
out a concessive line of response to this challenge. It was granted that Leibniz’s Law
supplies a universal criterion of identity, and that there is a corresponding universal
category. However, it was then argued that the internal structure of this universal
category is very much in keeping with the ontology embraced by Hale and Wright.
As a result, the concessive line of response supports a solution to the Caesar
Problem which, although it does not conform to the letter of the initial neo-Fregean
proposal, it does conform to its spirit.
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21 Since :Fx and F is a sub-categorical sortal, x does not fall under any sortal in jF jSubshare¼ : However,
since Gx and Sub-share=(F, G), x falls under some sortal in j F jSubshare¼ : Contradiction.
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Appendix: Proofs
Theorem 1 For any sortal F, F is a category if and only if F is a categorical
sortal.
Proof
? Suppose that Cat(F). To show: F is a categorical sortal of its equivalence class
j F jShare; i.e. for any x, Fx if and only if x falls under a sortal in j F jShare¼ :
? Suppose that Fx. By Definition 2, Share=(F, F), whence, by Definition 4, x
falls under a sortal in j F jShare¼ ; namely F.
/ Suppose that x falls under a sortal in j F jShare¼ —let it be G. For reductio
assume :Fx: Since Cat(F) and Gx, :Share¼ðF; GÞ: Contradiction. So, Fx.
/ Suppose that F is a categorical sortal. Suppose that :Fx and Gx. Since :Fx; by
Definition 5, x does not fall under a sortal in j F jShare¼ : So, by Gx, G is not in
j F jShare : By Definition 4, :Share¼ðF; GÞ: G and x were arbitrary, so
ð8xÞð:Fx ! ð8GÞðYx ! :Share¼ðF; G¼ÞÞÞ:
Theorem 2 For any two categorical sortals F, G, ð8xÞðFx $ GxÞ or
:ð9xÞðFx ^ GxÞ:
Proof For arbitrary categorical sortals F and G suppose, for reductio, that it
is not the case that ð8xÞðFx $ GxÞ or :ð9xÞðFx ^ GxÞ; i.e. :ð8xÞðFx $ GxÞ
and ð9xÞðFx ^ GxÞ: Since ð9xÞðFx ^ GxÞ; Share=(F, G)–by Principle 2. Now, :ð8xÞ
ðFx $ GxÞ; i.e. ð9xÞððFx ^ :GxÞ _ ð:Fx ^ GxÞÞ: Suppose that Fx ^ :Gx: Since
:Gx and G is a categorical sortal, x does not fall under any sortal in j G jShare¼ : So,
since Fx, F is not in j G jShare¼ ; hence :ShareðF¼; G¼Þ: The other case is similar.
Either way: :Share¼ðF; GÞ: Contradiction.
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